The money quandary

Thursday, September 30, 2010

The Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan are considering further quantitative easing. It's an explicit statement, as with the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, or implied by the fact that the foreign exchange intervention will eventually be sterilized if the policy rule is not changed, as with the Bank of Japan. Why more easing?

In response to this question, BCA Research (article not available) presented a version of the quantity theory of money. They looked at the simple linear relationship between the average rate of money supply growth (M2) and nominal GDP growth (P*Y).

The chart is a reproduction of that in the BCA paper, but with a sample back to 1959 (they went back to the 1920's when M2 was not measured). The relationship illustrates the 5-yr compounded annual growth rate of money (M2) against that of nominal GDP, and has an R2 equal to 50% - okay, but not perfect.

Nevertheless, the implication is pretty simple: the current annual growth rate of M2, 2.8% in August 2010, corresponds to an average annual income growth just shy of 4%. Sitting beneath a behemoth pile of debt relative to income, 4% nominal GDP growth is unlikely provide sufficient nominal gains for households to deleverage quickly or "safely".

However, notice the 2000-2005 and 2005-2009 points, where the relationship between M2 and nominal GDP growth deviated away from the average "quantity theory" relationship. Would a broader measure of money account for the weak(ish) relationship in the chart above? Yes, partially. (Note: the relationship almost fully breaks down at an annual frequency.)

These days it's all about credit. I'm sitting in Cosi right now - bought a sandwich and charged the bill on my credit card. Actually, I prefer to use cards. But M2 doesn't account for this transaction as money if the balance is never paid in full. M2 is essentially currency, checking deposits, saving and small-denomination time deposits, and readily available retail money-market funds (see Federal Reserve release).

One can argue about the merits of including credit cards balances as "money", per se. However, the sharp reversal of revolving consumer credit, and likely through default (see the still growing chargeoff rates for credit card loans), would never be captured in M2. The hangover from the last decade of households using their homes as ATM's (i.e., home equity withdrawal) and running up credit card balances to serve as a medium of exchange is dragging nominal income growth via a sharp drop in aggregate demand.

The Federal Reserve discontinued its release of M3 in 2006, which among other things included bank repurchase agreements (repos). Including M3, rather than M2, in the estimation improves the the R2 over 30 percentage points (to 81%).

This is a very small sample, and removing the latest data point from the original estimation improves the R2 slightly to 64%; but clearly there's something going on here. I think that it's fair to say that we may be disappointed by the M2 implied average nominal GDP growth rate over the next 5 years (4%).

According to John Williams' Shadow Statistics website, M3 is still contracting at (roughly because I don't subscribe to the data) 4% over the year. The relationship in the second chart implies that nominal GDP will fall, on average, about 4.5% per year. Japan's nominal GDP never contracted more than 2.08% annually during its lost decade, but the implication is that "things" may not be as rosy as the M2 measure of money suggests.

Rebecca Wilder


Evaluating the "excess" in the US corporate financial balance

Sunday, September 19, 2010

In a NY Times op-ed, Rob Parenteau and Yves Smith reminded us that the private sector financial balance is a function of the household financial balance and the corporate financial balance. They concluded the following regarding excess corporate saving:

So instead of pursuing budget retrenchment, policymakers need to create incentives for corporations to reinvest their profits in business operations.
In my view, it's not that simple (not that passing this type policy would be easy at all). As I illustrate below, firms, like households, are in a deleveraging cycle, where corporate excess saving is likely to persist for some time. (Note: US total corporate financial balance, excess saving if the balance is positive, is roughly undistributed profits minus gross corporate domestic investment)

In their NY Times article, Rob and Yves cite a 2005 JP Morgan study, "Corporates are driving the global saving glut". In that study, JP Morgan argues that the global saving glut has been driven largely by G6 excess corporate saving, and to a lesser extent emerging economies. In the US, positive corporate excess saving persisted through the latest print, 2010 Q2.

The illustration above plots the total corporate financial balance as a percentage of GDP. I calculate the Total Corporate Financial Balance (TCFB) as in the JP Morgan study, which is the residual of the national accounting identity of the Current Account Balance minus the Household Financial Balance minus the Government Financial Balance. According to this measure, the TCFB was roughly +3% in 2010 Q2, or about +1% above the 2008-2010Q2 average (2.1%).

About the same time as JP Morgan published their research, the IMF and the OECD were wondering why global TCFBs were rising. Several factors are attributed the upward trend in the first half of the 2000's, including (this is not a complete list of factors):
  • Repurchase of stock shares relative to dividend payouts
  • The falling relative price of capital goods dragging nominal investment spending as a share of GDP (see Table 3.2 of the OECD publication)
  • The overhang of leverage build in the 1990's
  • Rising profits via falling taxes and low interest payments (especially in other OECD economies)
Although firms likely worked out much of the debt overhang from the 1990's, the debt accumulation spanning the second half of the 2000's was precipitous.

It's very unlikely that the excess corporate saving will fall anytime soon, as non-financial business leverage is high just as household leverage is high. Total non-financial business debt peaked in 2009 Q1 at 79.5% of GDP and is now trending downward, hitting 74.9% in 2010 Q2.

If history is any guide, then the "excessive" borrowing spanning 2005-2008 will take some time to repair. Spanning 2002 to 2004, the non-financial business sector dropped leverage 2.5% to 64%. If this 2-year period of de-leveraging indicates an "equilibrium" level of leverage, then non-financial businesses are likely to run consecutive financial surpluses (excess saving) in order to reduce debt levels by another 11 percentage points of GDP for a decade more.

If firms run excess saving balances, then they're not investing in future profitability via capital expenditures nor increasing marginal costs, like wages and hiring, relative to profit growth. So while it is true that some fiscal policy should be targeted directly at investment incentives (Rob Parenteau and Yves Smith article), these measures may prove less effective since the non-financial business sector's desire to "save" and repair balance sheets is high.

I leave you with one final chart to inspire more discussion: a breakdown of the total corporate financial balance into its two parts, financial-business and non-financial business.

The financial balances in illustration 2 are computed directly from the Flow of Funds Accounts, Table F.8, rather than taking the residual as calculated in illustration 1. Thus, the total corporate financial balance will not match that in illustration 1.

The point is simple: the small drop in excess saving in total corporate financial balance in illustration 1 is stemming from the financial side. The non-financial corporate sector continues to raise excess saving by investing retained earnings into liquid financial assets relative to capital investment.

Fiscal policy should be targeted at the high desired saving by the corporate and household sectors alike. The idea is to pull forward the deleveraging process by "helping" households and firms lower debt burden via direct liquidity transfers (lower taxes or subsidies, for example). Only then will healthy private-sector growth resume.

Rebecca Wilder


Harmonised unemployment rates: a tad scary

Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Across the OECD, the unemployment rate was unchanged at 8.5% in July 2010.

The chart illustrates the harmonised unemployment rates for 28 economies in July spanning 2008-2010 (based on data availability, the comparison month is June for Chile, Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey, and May for the UK). The countries are ranked by the percentage change in the unemployment rate from 2008 to 2010, where Denmark is the highest, 115% increase, and Germany is the lowest, -4.2%.

The story in this chart is obvious: the slack in global economic activity remains extreme in much of the developed world. More growth it needed; but apparently, we're not going to get it.

The OECD released its index of composite leading indicators (CLI, where you can view the components of the index for each country here) for July. The pace of economic expansion is waning. (Click on chart to enlarge.)

From the release:

The CLI for the OECD area decreased by 0.1 point in July 2010. In Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, China and India there are stronger signals of a slower pace of economic growth in coming months than was anticipated in last month’s release. Stronger signals that the expansion may lose momentum have emerged in Japan, the United States and Brazil. Tentative signals have also emerged that the expansion phases of Germany and Russia may soon peak.
According to the composite CLI, the OECD hit a cyclical trough in May 2009 (14 months before the July release). Since then, the unemployment rate has risen in 20 of the 28 listed economies.

The robust global restocking of inventories fueled world export income; but that cycle is now over (see the chart on page 8 of the OECD's interim forecast). Furthermore, expansionary policy, which underpinned domestic demand around the world, is tightening.

Policy will turn expansionary again in several of these economies. The faltering sum of income will drag global growth further until stabilizing policy kicks in.

Rebecca Wilder


Private-sector leverage says that it's not Bill Clinton

Sunday, September 12, 2010

What's your answer? "Thinking about the past few decades… to the best of your knowledge, which ONE of the following U.S. Presidents do you think did the best job of managing the economy?"

  • Bill Clinton
  • Ronald Reagan
  • Barack Obama
  • Lyndon B. Johnson
  • George W. Bush
  • Richard Nixon
That's question #11 of the the Allstate-National Journal Heartland poll. 42% of the 1201 adults polled last month answered Bill Clinton.

I wonder why near half of those polled think that Clinton did the best job of “managing the economy”. Using one simple metric, private-sector financial leverage (accumulated dissaving), Clinton ranks among the top three worst economic managers, behind George Bush (Jr.) and Ronald Reagan.

The chart illustrates private-sector leverage as a stock of debt to GDP indexed to the start of each Presidential term. Therefore, the numbers are not the debt ratios, rather the appreciation of the debt ratios since the onset of each President's term. The data are from the Fed's Flow of Funds Accounts.

The sector financial balances model of aggregate demand posits that fiscal policy must shift in order to normalize GDP amid deviations of the private-sector surplus (desire to save) and the current account (see Scott Fullwiler’s article on the sector financial balances model of aggregate demand, which references similar work by Bill Mitchell and Rob Parenteau; or you can see last week’s answers and discussion to Bill Mitchell’s quiz for a simple outline).

When the private sector is levering up, the public sector is not doing its job. Since the 1990’s, the private sector loaded up on debt (ran private-sector deficits) in order to maintain GDP closer to full employment in the face of shrinking government deficits relative to those of the current account (since 1991 the current account trended down as a % of GDP). Deregulation, of course, contributed as well.

According to this metric, Barack Obama ranks highest to date, thanks to the automatic stabilizers and the ARRA. But we’ll see what happens when 2011 rolls around: the waning stimulus will drag economic growth; the Congressional tides may turn; and the immediacy of the crisis continues to fade. Unless firms start to “dissave” and pass on profits to households via hiring and wage growth, we may be in for a rocky ride, since the household desire to save will hover at very high levels for years to come (see David Beckworth’s post on the growing mismatch between mortgage debt load and real estate valuations).

Rebecca Wilder


My absence explained

Tuesday, September 7, 2010

Please hold on for just a bit more. I started a new position here in Boston and am waiting on compliance to clear my commentary online. I expect to be blogging regularly within the next week (or so).

Rebecca Wilder


  © Free Blogger Templates Columnus by 2008

Back to TOP